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THE NEED FOR MANDATORY ELECTRIC RELIABILITY
STANDARDS AND GREATER TRANSMISSION
INVESTMENT
The Honorable Joseph T. Kelliher *
Let me start with the usual disclaimer: the views I express are
my own and do not necessarily represent the official position of
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (the "Commission" or
"FERC"), the views of other commissioners, or the staff. I appre-
ciate the opportunity to share my views with you on reliability,
transmission investment, and industry restructuring.
I. NEED FOR ELECTRICITY LEGISLATION
I would like to begin my remarks by discussing why I believe it
is necessary for Congress to pass electricity legislation.
It has been more than a decade since Congress has enacted ma-
jor electricity legislation,1 and a lot has changed since that time.
Since then, we have witnessed dramatic price spikes in wholesale
power markets, followed by equally dramatic price collapses.2
There were attempts to manipulate power markets.3 There was a
* Commissioner, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2003-Present. B.S.F.S.,
1983, Georgetown University; J.D., 1994, American University, Washington College of
Law.
1. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 13201 (2000 & Supp. 1 2003)).
2. See generally OFFICE OF MKT. OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, FED. ENERGY
REGULATORY COMM'N, Docket M04-2-000, STATE OF THE MARKETS REPORT: ASSESSMENT
OF ENERGY MARKETS FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 2002 THROUGH JUNE 30, 2003, at 28-34
(2004) [hereinafter STATE OF THE MARKETS REPORT], available at http://www.ferc.gov/le
gal/ferc-regs/land-docs/som-2003.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
3. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, Docket PA02-2-000, FINAL REPORT ON
PRICE MANIPULATION IN WESTERN MARKETS: FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL
MANIPULATION OF ELECTRIC AND NATURAL GAS PRICES, at ES-1, (2003) [hereinafter FINAL
REPORT ON PRICE MANIPULATION IN WESTERN MARKETS], available at http://news.find
law.com/hdocs/docs/ferc/wstmrkt32603rptptl.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
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large expansion of generation by independent power producers,4
followed by an unprecedented financial downturn for energy
traders and independents.' Investment in the transmission grid
has been stagnant,6 and we have suffered three major regional
blackouts.
In my view, the time has come to make reforms to the Federal
Power Act (the "Act").' Any law reflects the circumstances of the
period in which it was enacted. Congress does not write a law on
a mountaintop; it looks around at the world that surrounds it.
Ideally, Congress considers that the world may change and pro-
vides flexibility in that law.
Consider the circumstances that surrounded enactment of the
Act. At the time it was written, there was virtually no interstate
commerce in electricity, there was no interstate transmission
grid, virtually all generation was built in load centers, and all as-
pects of the business-generation, transmission, and distribu-
tion-were presumed to be natural monopolies.' The Act reflects
an unspoken assumption by Congress that none of these circum-
stances would change.
The electricity market has changed dramatically since 1935.
Today, interstate commerce in electricity has exploded: the trans-
mission grid is not only interstate, but international; much gen-
eration is located remotely from load centers, not even necessarily
in the same state; and it has been demonstrated that there is no
natural monopoly in generation. 0
While the electricity market and industry have changed, the
Act remains unchanged in many respects. It is clear, however,
that many of the assumptions that governed development of the
4. See STATE OF THE MARKETS REPORT, supra note 2, at 64.
5. Id. at 3.
6. See id. at 72-73.
7. N. Am. Elec. Reliability Council, Examples of Major Bulk Electric System Power
Outages (Aug. 15, 2003) at http://fire.pppl.gov/blackout-history-table.pdf (last visited Nov.
9, 2004) [hereinafter Examples of Major Power Outages].
8. Federal Power Act §§ 201-214, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-824m (2000).
9. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, PUB. NO. DOE/EIA-0562(00),
THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 2000: AN UPDATE app. A
(2000) [hereinafter THE CHANGING STRUCTURE], available at http://www.eia.doegov/cneaf]
electricity/chg-stru-update/update2000.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004) (History of the U.S.
Electric Power Industry, 1882-1991).
10. See id. at ix-1.
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Act are no longer valid. There is a need to reform federal electric-
ity laws to reflect the dramatic changes that have swept across
the industry in the same manner that changes in the telecommu-
nications industry and financial services industry led Congress to
make reforms to the federal laws that govern those industries.
The pending energy legislation takes a step in the right direc-
tion. While the prospects for legislative action are uncertain, I
remain hopeful that Congress will pass comprehensive energy
legislation. If Congress fails to pass the pending energy legisla-
tion, we will have missed a great opportunity to reform our fed-
eral electricity laws.
II. NEED TO ASSURE RELIABILITY OF THE TRANSMISSION GRID
Let me turn now to a discussion of the need to assure reliability
of the interstate transmission grid. I will begin with a quote from
a report that investigated major regional power blackouts:
There is a sense of urgency throughout this report.... [Tihe electric-
ity industry is in a transition from a highly regulated industry domi-
nated by monopoly utilities to an industry that will rely, in large
part, upon competitive commercial markets at... the wholesale...
level[ ] .... The... old institutions for reliability are no longer suffi-
cient .... However, the new policies and institutions needed to as-
sure electric reliability are not yet in place. Until such policies and
institutions are in place, substantial parts of North America will be
exposed to unacceptable risk.1 '
Those words were written more than five years ago by the task
force that investigated the major regional blackouts that occurred
in the summer of 1996.12 The report concluded that the 1996
blackouts were caused by violations of voluntary reliability stan-
dards and poor vegetation management. 3 The report recom-
mended a host of actions, including the enactment of legislation
to provide for enforcement of mandatory reliability standards."
11. SEC'Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, Preface to MAINTAINING
RELIABILITY IN A COMPETITIVE U.S. ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY: FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON ELECTRIC SYSTEM RELIABILITY, at vii (1998) [hereinafter MAINTAINING
RELIABILITY], available at http://www.seab.energy.gov/publications/esrfinal.pdf (last vis-
ited Nov. 9, 2004).
12. Id. at ix-x.
13. Id. at xi, 1, 25, 58, 95.
14. Id. at 25-27.
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Unfortunately, very few of the recommendations were actually
implemented. 5 It is remarkable how little progress has been
made towards improved reliability in the past five years.
In August 2003, we experienced the largest blackout in this
country's history.'6 While the final report of the U.S.-Canada
Power System Outage Task Force has not yet been released,17 the
causes of the blackout are all too familiar: multiple violations of
voluntary reliability standards and poor vegetation manage-
ment.' There were also significant failures in the area of operator
training. 9
III. ENFORCEABLE RELIABILITY STANDARDS
One of the recommendations of the task force that investigated
the 1996 regional blackouts was that "[r]eliability standards must
be clear, transparent, nondiscriminatory, enforceable, and en-
forced. Compliance must be mandatory for all entities using the
bulk-power system."2 ° These words sound very familiar. In fact,
the last three major regional blackouts in this country-the July
1996, August 1996, and August 2003 blackouts-were all caused
in part by violations of voluntary reliability standards.21 The en-
forcement of reliability standards is absolutely essential. I do not
know how many times we have to learn the same lesson before we
make compliance mandatory.
For many years, the industry has relied on voluntary compli-
ance to assure reliability. 22 Self-reporting of violations has been a
signal failure. Some utilities either do not report violations or re-
15. U.S. -CANADA POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST 14,
2003 BLACKOUT IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: CAUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 139
(2004) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST 14, 2003 BLACKOUT], available at
https://reports.energy.gov/BlackoutFinal-web.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
16. John J. Fialka, Task Force Reports Several Events Led to Worst Blackout, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 15, 2003, at A5; see also FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST 14, 2003 BLACKOUT,
supra note 15, at 179.
17. The final report of the task force was issued on April 5, 2004, three days after the
Commissioner's speech.
18. FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST 14,2003 BLACKOUT, supra note 15, at 17-22.
19. Id. at 156-57.
20. MAINTAINING RELIABILITY, supra note 11, at xi.
21. See Examples of Major Power Outages, supra note 7.
22. FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST 14,2003 BLACKOUT, supra note 15, at 21.
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port that they are never in violation. Others conscientiously re-
port every minor technical violation.2' Regional reliability coun-
cils can convert general standards proposed by the North Ameri-
can Electric Reliability Council ("NERC").24 Some regions convert
a general standard into something tough, resulting in frequent
violations, while other regions convert the NERC standard into
something so vague that it is almost never violated.25
There are legitimate concerns about whether existing reliabil-
ity standards are clear enough to be fairly enforced. Let me just
say that to the extent that existing reliability standards are not
clear, they have been unclear for many years. I must admit to
some frustration on this point. For at least five years, the path to
enforcement of reliability standards has been well defined. There
has been virtual unanimity around the proposal that a self-
regulatory organization should be certified by the Commission to
develop reliability standards that would ultimately be enforced by
the Commission.26 After certification, the self-regulatory organi-
zation would submit whatever standards then existed for ap-
proval by the Commission. Congress has been considering elec-
tricity reliability legislation since 1999.2" Frankly, I am dismayed
that so little effort has been expended over the past five years on
making existing reliability standards clear enough to be fairly en-
forced.
Let me briefly review the recent history of self-reporting of re-
liability violations. According to NERC, utilities self-reported 541
violations of reliability standards in 2002,29 1,967 violations in
2001,30 683 violations in 2000,31 and 496 violations in 1999.32 It is
23. See, e.g., N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL, 2002 NERC COMPLIANCE ENFORCE-
MENT PROGRAM 3, 11 (2003) [hereinafter 2002 NERC COMPLIANCE ENFORCEMENT
PROGRAM], available at ftp://www.nerc.com/pub/sys/all-updl]compliance/2002 NERC_
Compliance-Report.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
24. FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST 14,2003 BLACKOUT, supra note 15, at 10-11.
25. See id. at 21-22.
26. See, e.g., Order on a Standards Development Organization for the Wholesale Elec-
tric Industry, [Apr.-Jun. 2002 Transfer Binder] 99 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH)
61,171 (May 16, 2002).
27. E.g., Energy Policy Act of 2004, H.R. 4503, 108th Cong. § 1211 (2004); Energy
Policy Act of 2003, S. 2095, 108th Cong. § 1211 (2004).
28. See THE CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 9, at app. C.
29. 2002 NERC COMPLIANCE ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 23, at 9.
30. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL, 2001 NERC COMPLIANCE ENFORCEMENT
PROGRAM 13 (2002), available at https://www.npcc.org/PublicFileslCompliance/NPCC
Compliance/Archives/Final200lNERCComplianceReport.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
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difficult to draw conclusions from those numbers, other than that
they are pretty large. Some utilities never self-report violations,
while others report everything that might constitute technical
violations of vague standards.A For that reason, it is impossible
to determine what the number of violations might be if reliability
standards were clear and enforceable. The true number may be
higher; it may be lower.
Continued reliance on voluntary compliance with unenforce-
able standards is no longer sufficient. There is no public confi-
dence in a regime that relies on voluntary compliance, and where
the reporting parties have complete discretion to determine
whether they have to report violations.
Before we can have enforceable reliability standards, we need
standards that are clear enough to be enforced. Due process con-
cerns can arise from enforcement of standards that do not put
parties on notice of what constitutes a violation.
Progress is finally being made to make reliability standards
clear enough to be enforced. I commend NERC and the industry
for their efforts in this regard and urge them to do everything
they can to complete this process as soon as possible.
In order to enforce reliability standards, you also need an en-
forcer. In my view, enforcement is inherently a governmental
function. The pending legislation would grant an electric reliabil-
ity organization the ability to impose penalties for violations of
reliability standards. 34 However, any such penalties would be
subject to review by the Commission, and the Commission would
retain the authority to impose penalties directly." The Commis-
sion is prepared to assume that responsibility and recognizes that
regulatory oversight is necessary to ensure compliance.36
31. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL, 2000 NERC COMPLIANCE ENFORCEMENT
PROGRAM 12 (2000), available at ftp://ftp.nerc.com/pub/sys/allupdl/compliance/
2000_ComplianceReport.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., 2002 NERC COMPLIANCE ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 23, at 9-
11.
34. Energy Policy Act of 2004, H.R. 4503, 108th Cong. § 1211 (2004); S. 2095, 108th
Cong. § 1211 (2004).
35. Id.
36. See generally MAINTAINING RELIABILITY, supra note 11, at xi.
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Currently, Commission staff are participating in NERC readi-
ness audits to determine whether control areas and reliability co-
ordinators are able to comply with NERC reliability standards
and are capable of reliably operating the grid.37 At the completion
of these audits, the Commission plans to hold a conference to de-
termine what was learned.
The pending energy legislation is silent on the penalties that
could be imposed in the event of violations.39 Some have argued
there is no need for monetary sanctions because peer pressure
will suffice to ensure compliance.4" I disagree strongly with that
point of view. If peer pressure were sufficient, then there would
be no need to enforce reliability standards. If the past three re-
gional blackouts have taught us anything, it is that peer pressure
is not enough. I do not know what the right penalties will be for
violations of reliability standards, but I suspect a range of penal-
ties for violations of varying significance would be appropriate.
Monetary penalties are a common means of enforcement in other
regulatory contexts41 and should be one of the penalties available
to the Commission. In addition, violations should be reported to
the Commission, and significant violations should be publicly dis-
closed.
There is a great deal of concern over what might happen in the
event the Senate fails to pass the energy legislation. While I am
optimistic the legislation will be enacted, it is possible the Senate
will fail to act. That raises the question of whether the Commis-
sion can take any steps to encourage or require compliance with
reliability standards. The Commission is reviewing its legal au-
thority to determine just what options are available.
37. N. Am. Elec. Reliability Council, Readiness Audit Program, at http://www.nerc.
com-rap(last visited Nov. 9, 2004) ("The audits will be conducted on a three-year cycle;
approximately fifty readiness audits will be completed by the end of 2004.").
38. The Commission held a technical conference on reliability readiness reviews on
September 29, 2004. The details of the conference can be accessed at http://www.ferc.gov
on the September 2004 Monthly Calendar webpage (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
39. See Energy Policy Act of 2004, H.R. 4503, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2095, 108th
Cong. (2004).
40. See, e.g., Who's in Charge Here? Industry, FERC, NERC, Pick Their Way Through
Reliability Questions, POWER MAG., Feb. 11, 2004, available at http://www.platts.com/
Magazines/POWER/Power%2ONews/2004/021104_14.xml (last visited Nov. 7, 2004); Fa-
cilitiesNet, FERC, Utilities Head for Court Clash on Rules to Avoid Blackouts, at
http://www.facilities net.com/news/Jan30newsl.shtml (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
41. E.g,, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 21, 21A, 21B, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u, 78u-1,
78u-2 (2000); Commodity Exchange Act § 6(c), 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2000).
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There has also been a great deal of interest in what the rela-
tionship would be between the Commission and the self-
regulatory organization, the electric reliability organization. I
would expect the relationship would operate much as the model it
is based on-the self-regulatory organization model in the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.42 The relationship between the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the securities ex-
changes has not been a constant one; it waxes and wanes,
depending on the level of confidence the SEC has in the various
exchanges.43 I would observe that today the SEC probably has
much less confidence in the New York Stock Exchange than in
the past, and appropriately gives greater scrutiny to decisions
made by the Exchange.
IV. VEGETATION MANAGEMENT
There is an urgent need for clear standards with respect to
vegetation management. Contact between trees and power lines
was a principal cause of not only the August 2003 blackout, but
also the July 1996 and August 1996 blackouts.' They are also the
single largest cause of distribution blackouts.45
A recent report prepared for the Commission concluded that
"[tihe current set of industry rules.., are [sic] not explicit
enough to ensure that utilities will strive toward the elimination
of [contact between trees and power lines]."46 In fact, the current
standard is so vague that it could be argued there is no vegetation
management standard at all.47 It is clear there is a need to ensure
development and enforcement of clear and consistent vegetation
management standards.
42. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2000).
43. See Susanne Craig & Kate Kelly, Weakened NYSE Must Face Challenges, SEC Is
Investigating Governance, and Rivals May Seek to Capitalize; Delicate Framework in
Question, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2003, at C1, 13.
44. Examples of Major Power Outages, supra note 7.
45. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, Executive Summary to UTILITY VEGETATION
MANAGEMENT FINAL REPORT 1 (2004), available at http://www.ferc.gov/cust-protect/moi/
uvm-final-report.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
46. Id. at 67.
47. See id. at 2, 8-11.
[Vol. 39:717
ENHANCING ELECTRIC RELIABILITY
Since contact between trees and both distribution and trans-
mission facilities is a common problem, I propose we develop a
common solution through collaboration between federal and state
regulators. Under the Act, the Commission has the authority to
establish joint boards composed of federal and state representa-
tives to develop solutions to problems in areas of mixed jurisdic-
tion. 8 I believe we should establish one or more joint boards to
develop a common vegetation management standard for distribu-
tion and transmission facilities that could be adopted and en-
forced at both the federal and state levels.
V. OPERATOR TRAINING
Significant failures in operator training played a major role in
the August 2003 blackout. Operators at FirstEnergy were deter-
mined to have poor situational awareness and misdiagnosed the
problems as they arose. In part, those failures were the result of
poor training. 9 FirstEnergy relied heavily on on-the-job training
for its operators, and that approach proved inadequate when op-
erators were presented with a situation they had never experi-
enced before.5°
This is an area where we could learn from the experience of the
nuclear industry. In the nuclear industry, control rooms are not
standardized; the same is true for grid control centers."l For that
reason, nuclear operators are licensed for a particular control
room.5 2 Perhaps we should do the same in the electricity industry.
Operators in the nuclear industry are also required to spend a
great deal of time in simulators, testing their ability to react to
unanticipated situations.53 This testing is designed to improve the
ability of operators to quickly and correctly diagnose a situation,
in order to avoid the failures of FirstEnergy operators.
48. 16 U.S.C. § 824h (2000); see also FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST 14, 2003
BLACKOUT, supra note 15, at 20-21.
49. FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST 14,2003 BLACKOUT, supra note 15, at 157.
50. See id.
51. See, e.g., Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulations, 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.40, 50.120,
App. M & N to pt. 50 (2004).
52. Id. § 55.53(b)-(c).
53. See id. §§ 55.31, 55.45-.46.
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In the nuclear industry, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 re-
quires that operators be licensed directly by the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission ("NRC"). 5 4 The NRC has the authority to revoke
operator licenses for violations of the Atomic Energy Act or when-
ever it "deems such action desirable."" Significantly, the NRC
has revoked operator licenses, and done so frequently.56 I believe
a grid operator should have his or her license revoked under simi-
lar circumstances.
At the Commission's reliability conference last December, we
learned that an operator license issued by NERC does not actu-
ally represent that an operator is ready to go into a control room
and manage system operations. In fact, a NERC license is proba-
bly closer to a learner's permit than a driver's license. I believe
the licensing process should be more rigorous. In my view, a li-
cense should not be granted until an individual is competent to
conduct system operations.
VI. NEED FOR GREATER INVESTMENT IN THE TRANSMISSION GRID
Enforcement of reliability standards, improved vegetation
management, and improved operator training are all necessary
conditions to assure reliability, but they are not sufficient by
themselves. We also need a more robust grid.
Expansion of the transmission grid is needed not only to assure
reliability but also to provide a foundation for effective competi-
tion in wholesale power markets. As I noted earlier, investment
in the transmission grid has been stagnant.57 To be precise, ac-
cording to the State of the Markets Report prepared by Commis-
sion staff, transmission investment in circuit miles grew less than
0.5 percent annually between 1998 and 2001.58
54. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 2137 (2000).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM ANNUAL
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2003, at xii, 20 (2003), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/enforcement/annual-rpts/03report.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004). En-
forcement programs for fiscal years 1998-2002 are also available at http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/annual-rpts (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
57. See STATE OF THE MARKETS REPORT, supra note 2, at 72-73.
58. Id.
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I believe the Commission should promote greater investment in
the transmission grid. In January 2003, the Commission issued a
proposed policy statement designed to encourage grid invest-
ment.59 Although the policy statement has not yet been finalized,
some of the principles in the policy statement have been incorpo-
rated into orders.6" Granting higher rates of return may indeed
induce greater transmission investment.
Encouraging the development of transmission companies
("transcos") may also result in increased grid investment. A re-
cent comparison of the capital expenditures of three transcos in-
dicates that transcos invest five times as much into transmission
expansion and upgrades as vertically integrated utilities. 61 That
suggests transcos may be a superior vehicle to secure investment
in transmission expansion.
For that reason, I would like to see the development of larger
transcos. Some of the transcos in the Midwest are small, repre-
senting the spinoff of the transmission assets of an individual
utility.62 However, the development of large transcos is unlikely
to occur solely through cash transactions.63 Large transcos may
develop through the transfer of transmission assets accompanied
by the retention of passive ownership interests, or through the
lease of transmission assets.'
59. Proposed Pricing Policy for Efficient Operation and Expansion of Transmission
Grid, 68 Fed. Reg. 3842 (proposed Jan. 27, 2003) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
60. See, e.g., Am. Transmission Co. and Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator,
Inc., [Apr.-June 2004 Transfer Binder] 107 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH)
61,117 (May 6, 2004); ISO New Eng. Inc., [Jan.-Mar. 2004 Transfer Binder] 106 Fed. En-
ergy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,280 (Mar. 24, 2004); Mich. Elec. Transmission Co.,
[Oct.-Dec. 2003 Transfer Binder] 105 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,214
(Nov. 17, 2003); PJM Interconnection, LLC, [July-Sept. 2003 Transfer Binder] 104 Fed.
Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,124 (July 24, 2003).
61. The five to one ratio is based on an analysis by Commission staff of reported capi-
tal expenditures of American Transmission Company, International Transmission Com-
pany and National Grid Company compared to their predecessors and the U.S. average.
62. STATE OF THE MARKETS REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.
63. Comments of National Grid USA on FERC Proposed Pricing Policy for Efficient
Operations and Expansion of Transmission Grid 5 (March 13, 2003) [hereinafter Com-
ments of National Grid USA] (on file in FERC Rulemaking docket no. PL03-1-000), avail-
able at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/filelist.asp?document-id=4083124 (last visited Nov.
9, 2004). The proposed pricing policy can be found at 68 Fed. Reg. 3842 (Jan. 27, 2003).
64. See Comments of National Grid USA, supra note 63, at 7-12.
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The reality is that for some time we will have both organized
and nonorganized wholesale power markets.65 For that reason,
the Commission's policies designed to encourage grid investment
should not be rooted in an assumption that organized markets
will be established in all regional power markets in the near fu-
ture. To date, transco development has been limited to the organ-
ized markets.66 I would like to see transco development in nonor-
ganized markets as well.
Until transcos develop more fully, vertically integrated utilities
will continue to account for the bulk of transmission investment.67
The prospect for grid investment by merchant transmission com-
panies appears to be quite limited. Since 2000, the Commission
has approved eight merchant transmission projects.6" Of those
eight projects, only one is operating, the Cross Sound Cable pro-
ject between Long Island and Connecticut, and that project is op-
erating under emergency orders issued by the Secretary of En-
ergy.69 One merchant project was withdrawn due to market
uncertainties." None of the remaining six projects have begun
construction, and they are on hold for various reasons.71
At this point, I am not convinced that vertical integration is the
primary barrier to investment in transmission capacity. If it
were, we would expect to see significant differences in transmis-
65. See STATE OF THE MARKETS REPORT, supra note 2, at 8-9.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 20-28.
68. See id. at 72.
69. U.S. Dep't of Energy Order No. 202-02-01 (Aug. 16, 2002), available at
http://www.energy.gov/engine/doe/files/import/OrderNo202-02-1.pdf (last visited Nov. 9,
2004); U.S. Dep't of Energy Order No. 202-03-2 (Aug. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.energy.gov/engine/content.do?PUBLIC-ID=14068&BTCODE=PRPRESSRE
LEASES&TTCODE=PRESSRELEASE (last visited Nov. 9, 2004). The emergency order
has since been rescinded, U.S. Dep't of Energy Order No. 202-03-4 (May 7, 2004), available
at http://www.energy.gov/engine/content.do?PUBLIC-ID=15821&BTCODE=PRPRESS
RELEASES&TTCODE=PRESSRELEASES (last visited Nov. 9, 2004), and the project is
now operating under a settlement agreement. Order Approving Uncontested Settlement,
[Apr.-June 2004 Transfer Binder] 107 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,258
(June 4, 2004).
70. Letter Order Accepting Withdrawal of Filing, Northeast Utilities Service Company
(FERC Docket No. ER01-2584), March 12, 2003, available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/id
mws/File-list.asp?document id=4082324 (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
71. See Neptune Regional Transmission System, LLC, FERC Docket No. ER01-2099;
TransCanada Energy Ltd., FERC Docket No. ER02-2389; TransEnergie U.S., Ltd., FERC
Docket No. ER02-406; TransEnergie U.S., Ltd., FERC Docket No. ER02-252; Chesapeake
Transmission, LLC, FERC Docket No. ER03-1311; Conjunction LLC, FERC Docket No.
ER03-452.
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sion investment behavior between regions where most of the gen-
eration has been divested-New York, New England, and Cali-
fornia-and those where vertical integration continues to be the
norm. To my knowledge, there is no evidence that transmission
investment is more robust in the former areas.
I also believe the Commission should explore adopting per-
formance-based regulatory mechanisms for transmission pricing
in order to encourage more efficient transmission operations.
Higher returns may encourage additional grid investment, but al-
lowing the transmission operator to retain a portion of the sav-
ings realized by efficiency gains may encourage more efficient op-
erations, including the deployment of new technology. That is
true whether the transmission operator is a transco or a verti-
cally integrated utility. Performance-based rates have succeeded
in other contexts and may better match the economic realities of
transmission investment than other financing schemes.72 Al-
though the Commission has had a performance-based rate policy
statement since 1992,"3 to my knowledge no applications have
been filed. I would encourage some brave soul to apply.
VII. PROMOTING COMPETITIVE WHOLESALE POWER MARKETS
Let me now turn to the Commission's role in promoting com-
petitive wholesale power markets. I will start with the threshold
question of whether the Commission should promote competitive
wholesale markets in the first place.
Over the past few years, there has been significant criticism of
the Commission for promoting "deregulation."74 I think that criti-
cism entirely misses the mark. To my mind, "deregulation" sug-
gests the absence of regulation, the absence of rules. However,
the reality is that all markets in this country operate under some
kind of rules, whether they are established by an economic regu-
72. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Takings Clause and Improvident Regulatory Bargains,
108 YALE L.J. 801, 801-02 (1999) (reviewing J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER,
DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE
TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997)).
73. Policy Statement on Incentive Regulation, [Oct.-Dec. 1992 Transfer Binder] 61
Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) $ 61,168 (Oct. 30, 1992).
74. See, e.g., MARK COOPER, CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., ALL PAIN, No GAIN:
RESTRUCTURING AND DEREGULATION IN THE INTERSTATE ELECTRICITY MARKET (2002),
available at http://www.consumerfed.org/allpain.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
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latory body or imposed under antitrust law. The Microsoft litiga-
tion shows that even the "New Economy" is subject to rules.7 5 To
my knowledge, there is only one exception: major league baseball,
which is not subject to regulation and is exempt from antitrust
law.76 As a Yankee fan by birth, that may not be a bad thing.
To my mind, the policy objective was never deregulation. It was
lowering electricity prices by promoting competition among power
producers. 77 By that standard, there has been some solid suc-
cess.7" Unfortunately, this success has been eclipsed by the spec-
tacular failures of California and Enron.79
There has been criticism of the Commission for promoting
competitive electricity markets. At times, the criticism suggests
that competition is some new-fangled theory the Commission de-
veloped, and faults the agency for experimenting on the country
with its pet theory.80 Again, I think this criticism entirely misses
the mark. In fact, it is inexplicable. It was Congress that intro-
duced competition in wholesale power markets, not the Commis-
sion. And it did so twenty-five years ago with the enactment of
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act ("PURPA") of 1978.81 It
was Congress that first recognized the linkage between effective
competition and open access. Both PURPA and the Energy Policy
Act of 1992 included open access provisions.8 2
In fact, competition has roots in federal electricity law that can
be traced back to the 1930s. Federal court decisions reviewing
constitutional challenges to the enactment of the Tennessee Val-
ley Authority Act of 1933 and the Rural Electrification Act of
1935 concluded that investor-owned utilities had no constitu-
.. .. .... V. vii-osorc uorp., ts( k'. 6upp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
76. See Fed. Base Ball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat'l League of Profl Base Ball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922).
77. See Policy Statement on Incentive Regulation, supra note 73.
78. STATE OF THE MARKETS REPORT, supra note 2, at 76.
79. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
80. See COOPER, supra note 74, at 7.
81. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2644 (2000)).
82. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 203, 92 Stat.
3117, 3136 (1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824j (2000)); Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-486, § 721, 106 Stat. 2776, 2915 (1992) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824j (2000)).
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tional right to be free from competition. 3 So, competition has
been a part of federal electricity policy from the very beginning.
Some perceive that the pending energy legislation somehow
marks a retreat from this longstanding federal policy promoting
competitive electricity markets.84 I dispute that notion. The bill
expressly states it is designed to "promote fair, open access to
electric transmission service" and "facilitate wholesale competi-
tion."85 The bill promotes open access by granting the Commission
additional authority over the unregulated utilities that own a
third of the interstate transmission grid. 6 Siting provisions were
included because of congressional concerns that transmission bot-
tlenecks were affecting interstate commerce in electricity. Mar-
ket manipulation provisions were included to make wholesale
markets operate effectively. 8
Some have observed that Congress is divided on electricity pol-
icy issues.8 9 I do not believe, however, that Congress is divided on
the central question of whether we should continue to rely on
competition in wholesale power markets.
Unless Congress fundamentally changes federal electricity law
in a way not envisioned by the pending energy legislation, the
Commission will continue to have a legal duty to ensure that
wholesale power markets are effectively competitive, in order to
assure just and reasonable prices.9"
Since it is clear the Commission has a duty to promote competi-
tive wholesale power markets, the question turns to what steps
the Commission can take to promote competitive markets. Devel-
opment of the Commission's policy initiatives has been made im-
83. Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 143-44 (1939); Ala.
Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 478-81 (1938); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297
U.S. 288, 339 (1936).
84. E.g., Joel Connelly, In the Northwest: The Energy Bill Would Be a Hoot if it Wasn't
so Sad, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 21, 2003, at A2; Editorial, Depleted Energy,
WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2003, at A24.
85. Energy Policy Act of 2004, H.R. 4503, 108th Cong. § 1232.
86. Id. § 1231.
87. Id. § 1221.
88. Id. § 1282.
89. See e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S6252 (daily ed. May 21, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Domenici).
90. Federal Power Act §§ 205-206, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d-824e (2000); see, e.g., Consol.
Edison Co. of N.Y. v. FERC, 347 F.3d 964, 967 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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measurably more difficult by some of the events that have oc-
curred since 1999: namely the California electricity crisis,91 the
collapse of Enron, the subsequent capital crisis facing independ-
ent power producers, 92 and the largest blackout in the history of
the country.93
The development of policies designed to promote competition in
wholesale power markets is complicated by the nature of our
wholesale power markets. The United States does not have a na-
tional wholesale power market. Our markets are regional in na-
ture, and there are significant differences among these regional
markets.94 One of the most significant differences is with respect
to structure. 95 Regional markets in the Northeast, California, and
Texas are organized markets, and the Midwest and Southwest
Power Pool are moving towards organized markets. 96 There are
significant differences in the rules of the organized markets.97
The rest of the regional markets are bilateral markets.9"
The Commission has been promoting development of regional
transmission organizations for a number of years,99 and there has
been substantial progress. However, the reality is that for some
time we will have both organized and bilateral wholesale power
markets. That reality will influence Commission policies, and the
challenge will be to develop policies that assure effective competi-
tion in both organized and bilateral markets.
As I noted earlier, while electricity markets have changed
dramatically, the Act has remained largely the same. Ever since
1935, the Commission has had a legal duty to prevent unjust and
unreasonable rates; °0 a legal duty to prevent undue discrimina-
91. See generally FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION ON WESTERN MARKETS AND THE CAUSES OF THE
SUMMER 2000 PRICE ABNORMALITIES (2000) (discussing factors affecting electric energy or
reliability of service in California and the Western region), available at http://www.ferc.
gov/legal/ferc-regs/land-docs/frontmatter.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
92. See STATE OF THE MARKETS REPORT, supra note 2, at 74-76.
93. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
94. See THE CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 9, at 6-9.
95. See id. at 6-9, 17-58.
96. See id. at 6.
97. See id. at 56-58.
98. See id. at 6.
99. See, e.g., Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,088 (Mar. 8, 2000)
(to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
100. Federal Power Act of 1935 § 205, 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2000).
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tion or preference;" 1 and a legal duty to assure that any disposi-
tion of jurisdictional facilities is in the public interest.12
Any actions the Commission takes to promote competitive
wholesale power markets must be guided by these legal duties.
By the same token, Commission policies are limited by the legal
authorities granted by Congress, since the Commission has only
those tools Congress has chosen to grant it. 103
The Commission has a legal duty to prevent unjust and unrea-
sonable rates in the sale of wholesale power by jurisdictional sell-
ers.10 4 The courts have determined that an unjust and unreason-
able rate is a rate that falls outside the "zone of reasonableness,"
which is bounded by monopoly rents on the high side and confis-
catory prices on the low side.0 5
Historically, the Commission has discharged this legal duty by
directly setting rates for individual sellers, typically setting a
cost-based rate that allows for cost recovery plus a regulated
profit margin.0 6 The task is more difficult in the context of com-
petitive markets, where instead of setting a rate the Commission
establishes policies that govern all jurisdictional power sellers.
When the Commission establishes price caps, as it has in the
organized markets and in the West, it does so in order to prevent
wholesale power prices from rising to the level of monopoly
rents.0 7 When it authorizes capacity payments, it does so to pro-
vide generators a reasonable opportunity to make a profit.
It is often overlooked that as a legal matter confiscatory
prices-prices so low that they effectively guarantee an investor
will never recover his investment-are unjust and unreason-
101. Id. §§ 824d(a), e(a).
102. Id. § 824b(a).
103. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2000).
104. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e (2000).
105. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 306 F.3d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("Absent pro-
cedural or methodological flaws, the court may only set aside a rate that is outside a zone
of reasonableness, bounded on one end by investor interest and the other by the public in-
terest against excessive rates.").
106. See, e.g., Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County v. Dynergy Power Mktg., Inc.,
384 F.3d 756, 758 (9th Cir. 2004).
107. See generally San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., [Apr.-June 2001 Transfer Binder] 95
Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) T 61,418 (June 19, 2001), reh'g granted in part [Oct.
-Dec. 2001 Transfer Binder] 97 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,275 (Dec. 19,
2001).
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able.' The Commission does have a legal duty to develop policies
that provide investors in existing power plants an opportunity to
recover their investment and a reasonable profit, as well as at-
tract investment in new generation.' 09 Some question whether our
policies accomplish this objective.
Let me briefly discuss some of the Commission's policy initia-
tives designed to make wholesale power markets more competi-
tive.
Historically, the role of the Commission has been to set rates."0
Increasingly, that role has changed to one of regulating mar-
kets."' That is a very different role. The Commission has strug-
gled valiantly to develop market rules to govern competition in
wholesale power markets in a manner consistent with its legal
duties under the Act.
112
This effort is most obvious in the organized markets, where
spot markets are governed by rules approved by the Commis-
sion. 1 3 In some cases, these rules have not worked well. In a per-
fect world, flaws in market rules in the organized markets will be
swiftly identified, either by the market monitor or through com-
plaints, the regional transmission organization would propose
changes to the rules, and the Commission would evaluate the
proposal and issue a ruling. There are times when actual experi-
ence has fallen short of this ideal.
The need for market rules is not limited to the organized mar-
kets, however. For example, there is a need for rules to proscribe
market manipulation in both the organized markets and bilateral
markets. Markets subject to manipulation cannot operate prop-
erly, and there is an urgent need to proscribe manipulation of
108. Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 (1942) ("By
long standing usage in the field of rate regulation, the 'lowest reasonable rate' is one which
is not confiscatory in the constitutional sense.").
109. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 605 (1944) ("Rates
which enable [a] company to operate successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to
attract capital, and to compensate its investors for the risks assumed certainly cannot be
condemned as invalid.. ").
110. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2000); Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County, 384 F.3d at
758.
111. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County, 384 F.3d at 760-61.
112. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
113. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., [Oct.-Dec. 2000 Transfer Binder] 93 Fed. En-
ergy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,121 (Nov. 1, 2000).
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electricity markets.114 I believe the Commission has adequate le-
gal authority to determine certain marketing practices to be un-
just and unreasonable. To be clear, I have not taken a position on
the Market Behavior Rule approved by the Commission in No-
vember 2003, which is subject to rehearing, and I cannot discuss
the order here today. However, I believe market manipulation
must be proscribed.
One area that requires legislative action is the Commission's
penalty authority. Unlike other economic regulatory agencies, the
Commission lacks civil penalty authority for most violations of
the Act." 5 Under the Act, civil penalties are limited to violations
of provisions added by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, principally
the wheeling provision." 6 The Commission's limited civil penalty
authority is a factor in the negotiation of settlements with parties
that have violated the Act.
The Commission's criminal penalty authority is also grossly in-
adequate. Under the Act, a knowing and willful violation is sub-
ject to a maximum penalty of $500 per day,"' an amount set in
1935.118 1 think it unlikely that a criminal penalty capped well be-
low the hourly rate of a self-respecting criminal defense attorney
will deter market manipulation.
For that reason, I have long supported legislation to impose
tougher civil and criminal penalties. In fact, I supported tougher
penalties back in 1998, well before the Enron marketing scandal
came to light. To me, it seemed obvious that the feeble civil and
criminal penalties in the Act would prove inadequate to deter
market manipulation. Unfortunately, I was proven right.
114. See FINAL REPORT ON PRICE MANIPULATION IN WESTERN MARKETS, supra note 3;
Investigation of Terms and Conditions of Public Utility Market-Based Rate Authoriza-
tions, [Oct.-Dec. 2003 Transfer Binder] 105 Fed. Reg. Energy Rep. Comm'n Rep. (CCH)
61,218 (Nov. 17, 2003), order on reh'g, [Apr.-June 2004 Transfer Binder] 107 Fed. Energy
Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,175 (May 19, 2004).
115. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO-02-656, ENERGY MARKETS:
CONCERTED ACTIONS NEEDED BY FERC TO CONFRONT CHALLENGES THAT IMPEDE
EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT 48-49 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02656.
pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
116. Federal Power Act § 316A, 16 U.S.C. § 825o-1(b) (2000).
117. Federal Power Act § 316(b), 16 U.S.C. § 825o(b) (2000).
118. Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 862 (1935).
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The Commission also takes steps to prevent the exercise of
market power, both horizontal and vertical market power. n 9 Cur-
rently, the Commission allows jurisdictional sellers to charge
market-based rates when they demonstrate they lack market
power, or to mitigate such market power.12° The agency is exam-
ining the generation market power test it currently uses in mar-
ket-based rate applications, the Supply Margin Assessment.12'
The test was announced in November 2001, but was subsequently
put in abeyance. 22 Over seventy utilities have failed the test, but
no mitigation has yet been imposed.
One of two things must happen: either the test must be re-
formed or replaced, or it must be applied, and mitigation imposed
on those who fail.123 In January 2004, the Commission held a two-
day conference on its generation market power test. 2 4 There was
a very interesting discussion on how to properly measure genera-
tion market power, and what mitigation should be imposed in the
event a seller is determined to have generation market power.
12
Some of the presenters argued that vertical market power is a
much more serious concern than horizontal market power. 26
119. STATE OF THE MARKETS REPORT, supra note 2, at 21-22.
120. See Elizabethtown Gas Co. v. FERC, 10 F.3d 866, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Tejas
Power Corp. v. FERC, 908 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1990); STATE OF THE MARKETS
REPORT, supra note 2, at 21-22.
121. See Notice of Technical Conference on Supply Margin Assessment Screen and Al-
ternative, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,229 (Dec. 30, 2003); Before Commissioners: Conference on Sup-
ply Margin Assessment, AEP Power Marketing, Inc., AEP Service, Corporation, West Ser-
vices, Inc., Entergy Services, Inc., Southern Company Energy Marketing L.P.,
Supplemented Notice of Technical Conference on Supply Margin Assessment Screen and
Alternatives, 69 Fed. Reg. 2591 (Jan. 16, 2004).
122. Order on Triennial Market Power Updates and Announcing New, Interim Genera-
tion Market Power Screen and Mitigation Policy, [Oct.-Dec. 2001 Transfer Binder] 97 Fed.
Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,219 (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter "SMA order"]. On
December 20, 2001, the Commission issued a Notice Delaying Effective Date of Mitigation
and Announcing Technical Conference, which deferred the date by which companies were
required to implement mitigation for spot market energy sales required by the SMA order.
123. On April 14, 2004, the Commission issued an order on rehearing that modified the
generation market power analysis and mitigation policy set forth in the SMA order. Order
on Rehearing and Modifying Interim Generation Market Power Analysis and Mitigation
Policy, [Apr.-June 2004 Transfer Binder] 107 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH)
61,018 (Apr. 14, 2004).
124. Conference on Supply Margin Assessment, 69 Fed. Reg. 2591 (Jan. 16, 2004); No-
tice of Technical Conference on Supply Margin Assessment Screen and Alternatives, 68
Fed. Reg. 75,229 (Dec. 30, 2003).
125. Transcript of FERC Technical Conference in the Matter of Supply Margin As-
sessment, Docket No. PL02-8-000, at 7-25, 54-55.
126. Id. at 86-92 (presentation of Steven Cornelli).
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There may be a broader initiative later this year that looks at
both horizontal and vertical market power issues.
127
The Commission also considers generation market power is-
sues when it reviews proposals by vertically integrated utilities to
acquire the generation assets of financially distressed independ-
ent power producers. The Commission has great respect for the
decisions of states when it comes to the need by a state-regulated
utility for new electricity supply. However, if a vertically inte-
grated utility proposes to acquire a power plant from a financially
distressed independent, the Commission has a legal duty under
the Act to review the impact of the acquisition on competitive
markets.12 8 The Commission cannot waive this legal duty. If an
acquisition has a negative impact on competitive markets, that
does not mean the transaction will necessarily be disapproved;
the negative impact may be mitigated through conditions. 29
If a vertically integrated utility proposes to buy power from an
affiliate, that sale is also subject to review by the Commission.
The Commission has a legal duty under the Act to assure that
there is no abuse of self-dealing, and that there is no undue dis-
crimination or preference. 130 Again, the Commission cannot waive
this legal duty.
There is a perception that the Commission is unalterably op-
posed to these acquisitions. That perception is simply incorrect. If
the Commission were unalterably opposed to these transactions,
it would have uniformly rejected utility applications to acquire
independent generation. It has not done so.' 31
127. See Initiation of Rulemaking Proceeding on Market-Based Rates and Notice of
Technical Conference, [Apr.-June 2004 Transfer Binder] 107 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n
Rep. (CCH) 61,019 (Apr. 14, 2004).
128. Federal Power Act § 203, 16 U.S.C. § 824b (2000); Inquiry Concerning the Com-
mission's Merger Policy Under the Federal Power Act; Policy Statement, 61 Fed. Reg.
68,595, 68,596 (Dec. 30 1996).
129. Ameren Energy Generating Co., [July-Sep. 2004 Transfer Binder] 108 Fed. En-
ergy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,081 (July 29, 2004).
130. Federal Power Act §§ 205-206, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d-824e (2000).
131. Ameren Corp., [July-Sep. 2004 Transfer Binder] 108 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n
Rep. (CCH) 61,094 (July 29, 2004); Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., [July-Sep. 2004 Transfer
Binder] 108 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,004 (July 2, 2004); Puget Sound
Energy, Inc., [Apr.-June 2004 Transfer Binder] 107 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH)
9T 61,082 (Apr. 23, 2004); S. Cal. Edison Co., [Jan.-Mar. 2004 Transfer Binder] 106 Fed.
Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 91 61,183 (Feb. 25, 2004); Cinergy Services, Inc., [Jan.-
Mar. 2003 Transfer Binder] 102 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 1 61,128 (Feb. 4,
2005]
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VIII. FEDERAL AND STATE RELATIONSHIP
I would like to briefly touch on the relationship between federal
and state regulators. Richmond is probably the perfect setting for
such a discussion. I recognize the difference between the electric-
ity regulatory regime and other energy regulatory regimes. In
other regimes, such as nuclear regulation, there is no state role-
states are completely preempted. 13  Electricity regulation is dif-
ferent. The electricity regulatory scheme is federalist in nature,
and the state role is very important. Thomas Jefferson would
probably have approved of our electricity regulation scheme;
Alexander Hamilton would likely have preferred the nuclear
regulatory scheme.
I respect the important role of the states in electricity regula-
tion. The division of labor between the federal government and
the states in the area of electricity regulation is defined in the
Act. States are granted jurisdiction over retail sales and local dis-
tribution, while the Commission is granted authority over whole-
sale power sales and the interstate transmission grid. 1 3 I think
the boundaries established by the Act still work today.
On occasion, there will be conflict between federal and state
regulators. 34 I think it will not be common; rather, it will be the
exception to the norm, although probably inevitable. Our legal
duties are different, and the customers we are charged by law to
protect are different. When there is conflict, I would like to think
it is because of the conflict between our legal duties, not any other
reason.
2003).
132. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190 (1983).
133. Federal Power Act, § 201(a)-(b), 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a-b (2000).
134. See Frank A. Wolak, The Crisis in Electricity Re-Structuring (And How to Fix
It), at http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/research/conferences/calelectricity/wolakslides2.pdf
(last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
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